Access and Inclusion/Exclusion in Global Governance

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When Nico Krisch approached me to participate in this conference in Barcelona he asked me to produce a short "think piece" to begin the conversation. When I sat down in early December to write this I realised that I had no idea what a *think piece* actually was!

So my first port of call was to the *Oxford English Dictionary*. It defines think piece as "chiefly Journalism, an article containing discussion, *analysis, or opinion, as opposed to fact or news*" (my emphasis). Some examples that they give are pejorative and suggest that some *think pieces* take the form of what (especially in today's Trumpian/nativist neo-liberal world) is consistently referred to as "fake news". The first instance OED cites is from 1935 from *Harper's Magazine* (1 Dec. 701/2). "We [reporters] wanted to work but there was nothing with which to build. So we *faked* and wrote 'think pieces' and sat about, glass in hand, until something happened to break the monotony" (my emphasis). The OED gives subsequent examples along these lines. However its entry concludes with a couple of contemporary citations from 2000 where the concept is presented more neutrally. One concerns "the souring of the American dream" and another "by leading Mexican leftist intellectuals on the future of the political left in that country", entries that may have anticipated important contemporary developments. Also the *Miriam-Webster Dictionary* defines "think piece" as "a piece of writing meant to be *thought-provoking and speculative* that consists chiefly of background material and personal opinion and analysis."

So I will try to offer a thought-provoking, speculative and analytical piece, offering personal opinions, addressing the questions historically and prospectively, whilst attempting to avoid the pitfalls of "fake news."

Terminology

Here I would like to make a couple of initial points.

First, reflecting on the title of this conference I have always been conscious of the notion of *access* since my father was disabled at a relatively early age as a result of major injuries sustained in wartime, and for many years my elderly mother has had significant mobility challenges. For them specific regulations and physical, social and healthcare provisions are and were necessary for them to physically have access to many aspects of everyday life and to help live fulfilling lives. So let me express an *opinion* about this since I believe it raises basic questions concerning rights, responsibilities and the frameworks that govern access and social inclusion. In a socially oriented society access to such provisions should be provided, on a universal basis as a means of constituting the fundamental rights of citizens – human rights rest upon a foundation of material rights.

By contrast, in an individualistic self-help society as advocated by many contemporary neoliberal thinkers who believe that the market mechanism is the most efficient and desirable form of social provisioning, such access would have to be paid for in order for the beneficiary to qualify. Thus in so far as the ability to pay mediates access, it would necessarily result in inequalities of provision. So from the beginning the question of access needs to be defined ethically, politically and in material terms. Defined beyond narrow conceptions of representation and electoral participation (all animals are equal), this involves deeper questions concerning the nature of society, inequality and social justice (since some are or may be more equal than others). Implicitly this may connect to the questions of global governance.

Second, and pursuant to the above, you will note from the title of my piece I have articulated the terms exclusion and *inclusion* using a forward slash (/). I prefer to use the phrase *inclusion/exclusion* in the sense that the constitution of any known political order or framework of governance, whether local, regional and global, has always contained principles of inclusion and exclusion in ways that are interrelated dialectically.[1] These principles can not only be narrowly political – systems of voting, representation and consultation – but they can also be connected to the fundamental question of what can be included or excluded from the objects and discourses of governance. For example Hayek and Buchanan – focusing mainly on national constitutional orders but extending this to discuss both the constitution of the European Union (Buchanan) and world order (Hayek) – wish to remove fundamental constitutional and governance questions and to insulate the rights of private property and capital from the purview of democracy, contestation and broader participation, confining permissible political questions to what Buchanan calls "ordinary politics", e.g. questions concerning the regulation and reproduction of the existing order, thereby discursively including certain kinds of considerations and excluding others that might point towards different forms of regulation or entirely different forms of society that might be much more inclusionary and reflective of the real living conditions that a majority of people actually face.

Global Governance "as it is and as it ought to be": Some Conceptual, Ontological and Normative Issues

Furthermore as we argued earlier (Bakker and Gill 2003) this underlines the fact that my conceptualisation of governance does not mean "governance without government", since

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[1] Exclusionary political principles can be contrasted with, for example the constitution of the Correspondence Societies, organised in the late 1790s to allow for communication amongst dissident political groups in England in the wake of the repression and legal emergency measures that were imposed by the Crown as a result of fears among the ruling classes concerning the potentially democratic and insurgent impact of the French Revolution on Britain. These measures prohibited even small groups of people meeting for any purpose. According to EP Thompson, in *The Making of the English Working Class*, the principles of the Correspondence Societies were fundamentally democratic and its membership was defined as follows: "And let their numbers be unlimited".

governance involves both public and private mechanisms and " governments that ultimately pass laws and implement them":

> Governance involves ideas that justify or legitimate political power and influence, institutions through which influence is stabilized and reproduced, and patterns of incentives and sanctions to ensure compliance with rules, regulations, standards and procedures. Governance thus entails both public and private forms of power, institutions of state and civil society, and it operates either within particular localities, or across national boundaries in regional or global frameworks (Bakker and Gill 2003:5).

This brief observation also illuminates the *ontological* question, what is global governance *as it currently exists*?

I would suggest that the ontology of global governance today refers principally to the dominant project and frameworks of governance and rule associated with the post Cold War capitalist world order and its main juridical, regulatory and political mechanisms. They stabilize, modify, extend and legitimate ruling institutions, the distribution of power and, as such reinforce the global capitalist *status quo*. Thus:

> Global governance today involves devising durable methods, mechanisms, and institutions – including the use of organized violence – to help sustain an unequal international order that is premised on the primacy of capital, the world market and US geopolitical power as the key governing forces of world politics (Gill 2015: 1).

These frameworks of governance – in the context of crises of capitalism, of social reproduction and ecological sustainability – are often articulated by leading organic intellectuals acting individually or collectively to provide normative and theoretical justification.[2] They are often associated with the interests and dominance of large transnational corporations and super-wealthy plutocrats and investors drawn from the most powerful states. They involve the wider incorporation and co-optation of a range of allied and other interests, particularly as the poles of global capital accumulation are being extended in the Asia-Pacific, the Americas and in the former East Bloc. It also needs to be observed that these frameworks are the products of both public and private forces, reflected for example in the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum which in many respects could be regarded as the new "international" of global capitalism.

The normative projects associated with these frameworks in the emerging neoliberal world order are partly synonymous with what the World Bank and the IMF refer to in more normative terms as "good governance", and the entrenching of global 'best

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[2] *Social reproduction* refers to institutions and frameworks, mentalities and justifications associated with the ways in which in which any society produces, consumes and reproduces itself. Feminists note that it involves crucial gender dimensions that concern biological reproduction, the reproduction of the labour force, household divisions of labor and caring institutions, including those education, health and welfare.

practices' via concepts of "limited government", minimal or self-regulation of business and finance, and pro-market reforms, partly locked in by the juridical, legal and regulatory frameworks that I have called the "new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism", which serve to restrict debate and discussion to the frameworks of "ordinary politics" in the sense used by Buchanan and Hayek. Such legal-normative frameworks are ultimately backed by systematic use of organised violence in the form of military power and related geopolitical practices, often justified or camouflaged by the expediency of forms of international law applied in arbitrary and unequal ways.

However, judged on its recent record, one might conclude that global governance as it really is, with its intensifying social, racial and gendered inequalities, has neither stabilized nor legitimated the existing world order. Indeed many of the policies actually being carried out in its name may be undermining the well-being, health and the human security of a majority of people (Gill 2012). The morbid symptoms of the situation are reflected, on a planet characterized by increasing food and energy crises and crises of social reproduction and accumulation, the exploitation of human beings and nature, dispossession of livelihoods and the social, knowledge and geographical commons, amid widespread pollution, dumping of waste and ecological depletion. These developments combine in a situation of what I call a *global organic crisis* involving intersecting multi-dimensional structural crises that will, in my opinion, serve to constitute the problematic of global governance for the future.

Thus prevailing normative perspectives on global governance – associated with the hegemony or supremacy of capital under the US led capitalist alliances in post-war development – nevertheless involves a dialectical relation with a wide range of both progressive and reactionary counter forces and movements which have been emerging in recent decades throughout the world, including the United States, where on the one hand there is growing support for democratic socialism (reflected in the presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders) as well as for reactionary nationalist plutocratic neoliberalism (reflected in the election of Donald Trump).

From an epistemological and strategic viewpoint, critical perspectives invoke considerations of the relationship between rulers and ruled and whether the purpose of politics is to sustain, transform or replace the status quo – and therefore of power, political economy, with for example, questions concerning ethics and the legitimate rule of law at the centre of its analysis (Gill 2012). It asks: global governance of what, for whose benefit, why and whither? To use the well-known epistemological distinction of Robert Cox, these perspectives are *critical*, seeking to identify contradictions and potential transformations and forms of praxis that could constitute a different kind of global governance and world order. They are counterposed to problem-solving and technocratic theories that seek to sustain the existing order and to govern and regulate it accordingly. Of course a critical theory can also be problem-solving in so far as it addresses key issues and problems involving technical and scientific questions such as ecological degradation, species extinction, inequality and other elements that global governance could or should address. This epistemological distinction can be used as a

criterion to identify and differentiate between the different sets of practices associated with the reform or potential transformation global governance today, and the degree to which they interact and overlap.

Inclusion/Exclusion, Hegemony and Supremacy: A Conceptual Reflection

So what is inclusion/exclusion in global governance? As may be clear from the above comments I approach this question from the vantage points of ethics, political theory, geopolitics and global political economy, and here I would suggest that despite its changes over time – with a significant interregnum associated with two world wars and the crisis of the 1930s – global governance has been principally defined by notions of inclusion/exclusion that have tended to reflect the prevailing hegemony or dominance of capital and the most powerful capitalist states, with its principles of its inclusion sometimes involving the incorporation of subordinated or subaltern elements in social structures and allied states, in ways that have been strongly associated with the extension and regulation of the capitalist world market.

Hegemony at the world level refers to the authority and power of political forces (e.g. consisting of ruling forces in constellations of state-civil society complexes) that exercise governance functions over a multi-tiered system of jurisdictions to manage and extend the global political economy. In practice this involves not simply system management but also modalities of transformation as the elements of world order undergo change, including the reproduction and dissemination of dominant or hegemonic social and cultural forms as models for emulation. Hegemony is associated with what Gramsci called intellectual and moral leadership and political strategies that give weight to and seek to incorporate potentially politically significant subordinate interests to widen the power bloc that exercises rule.

In practice at the global level, hegemony is only rarely approximated, and typically involves the violent subordination of subordinate the peripheral interests that are marginalised or excluded from consideration and participation in forums of deliberation adjudication and regulation. In situations where dominance, violence and coercion tend to be the norm, which seems to be reflected in the contemporary post-Cold War shift towards autocratic authoritarian neoliberalism in many jurisdictions, fraud and corruption provide evidence of the absence of hegemonic power and leadership. In these situations what I call "supremacy" and dominance tend to prevail.

In practice the processes of hegemony – a concept that needs to be understood dialectically and as involving the quality and dynamics of the relations between rulers and ruled – involve not only public institutions and formal international organisations (which themselves reflect and internalise a dialectic between the institutionalisation of power and incipient transformative forces) but also private networks and linkages partly associated with the accumulation of capital and the fostering of commercial opportunities throughout the world. By contrast supremacy involves dominance and coercion – exercised over relatively fragmented or divided subaltern forces where opposition has not coalesced into organised and politically powerful alternatives (Gill 1995, 2008).

Global Governance: Historical Examples from the Development of World Capitalism

So if we go back to the early merchant capitalism – which Fernand Braudel (1992) traces back to the 11th century and the Italian city states such as Venice and Genoa – we can also indicate the lineages of some of the forms of proto-hegemonic dimensions of global governance as we understand them today.

Here we might remember how Braudel defines "world capitalism" – and its associated forms of governance – as a dominant, frequently predatory force that seeks to extract surplus across social orders and political jurisdictions across space and time, in effect where necessary and were profitable, with its "finger in every pie." In so doing it employs its "chief privilege – the ability to choose":

> A privilege resulting at once from its dominant social position, from the weight of its capital resources, its borrowing capacity, its communications network, and, no less, from the links which create between the members of a powerful minority – however divided it may be by competition – a series of unwritten rules and personal contacts (1992: 622).

Braudel points out one of the key things about the emergence of merchant capitalism, with its extensive trading and financial links across Europe, and indeed throughout the world was therefore its ability to combine knowledge and technologies that allowed it to communicate and control over long distances and to use its resources to maximise profit in ways that transcended the local governance structures of municipalities, principalities and far-flung empires including the transnational power as well as the normative and governing frameworks of the Holy Roman Empire. "World capitalism" reflected a new global perspective and mode of governance transcending jurisdictions, time and space.

As merchant capitalism developed its centre of gravity shifted from Italy northward to Antwerp and subsequently to Amsterdam, and it was in Amsterdam that I would suggest the modern concepts of global governance were consolidated. In *The Perspective of the World* (1992) Braudel notes how Dutch hegemony in 17th-century Europe centred upon concepts of the primacy of the private individual and commerce allowing freedom of enterprise to the merchants, with Dutch policy involving the "unceasing defending and safeguarding, throughout ... of the interests "of commerce as a whole. Such interests dictated and outweighed all else, something which neither religious passion (after 1672 for instance) nor national sentiment (after 1780) were ever able to undo". (1992: 205).

In a sub-section entitled "Traders to Europe, traders to the world" Braudel further notes:

> The first condition for Dutch greatness was Europe. The second was the world – could it not be said indeed that the one followed from the other? Once Holland had conquered the trade of Europe, the rest of the world was a logical bonus, thrown in as it were. But in both cases, Holland used very similar methods to impose her commercial supremacy or rather monopoly, whether close to home or far away (1992: 207).

It goes without saying that many of the discursive justifications for Dutch supremacy and with it the methods to globalise merchant capitalism from its European epicentres involved some of her foremost thinkers, indeed early organic intellectuals, such as Hugo Grotius who articulated concepts of international law including the idea of the freedom of the seas, partly providing ideological justification for the expansion Dutch naval power and the activities of its trading companies and business monopolies.

The "hegemony" of merchant capital focused on "world cities." Its social and political base *included* nationally and internationally diverse people but typically included a small dynastic minority, an incipient bourgeoisie with its range of bankers, traders, middlemen, shop vendors and urban dwellers (at the same time it *excluded* probably 90% of the world's population, principally in the villages or nomads) as well as many workers employed in trading activity. Every town of importance between the 15th and 18th centuries, particularly if it was a seaport, was a "Noah's Ark", a "fair of masks" and a "Tower of Babel." "Under the pillars of the Amsterdam Bourse – which was a microcosm of the world of trade – one could hear every dialect in the world". "The rule in Noah's Ark was live and let live." (All quotes from Braudel 1992:30).

These extraordinary world cities, at the centre of the global economy and incipient forms of global governance – such as Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, and later London and New York, were powerful social models and cultural centres which radiated their power and dazzled observers, whilst at the same time subordinating and extracting surplus from their local and far-flung peripheries. For example "Amsterdam was, in Descartes' view, an "inventory of the possible", a cornucopia reflecting all the commodities and the curiosities "one could wish for", producing dazzle and bewilderment in its viewers. Braudel further notes that with respect to Amsterdam's successor as the dominant world city, London, "Every visiting foreigner, particularly if he was French in the age of Voltaire and Montesquieu, made desperate efforts to understand and make sense of London... Perhaps the visitor feels the same about New York today (Braudel 1992:30).

The rise to such leadership was attended upon significant changes in international relations and in particular the following the European "systemic chaos" culminating in the 30 Years War, with efforts to create a new international order in the Peace of Westphalia and Munster. As Giovanni Arrighi (1993) points out, the Dutch would become hegemonic by leading a powerful coalition of dynastic states toward the transcendence of the medieval system of rule and to move towards principles that might, in time, lead to establishment of what we would call the modern inter-state system. In and following the Peace of Westphalia Dutch leadership was crucial in developing convincing proposals for a major reorganization of the pan-European system of rule with its social purposes extended to include both religious tolerance and, in the field of commerce, an attempt to abolish barriers to trade and, with respect to its conduct during war and conflict, the creation of rules aimed at protecting the property and commerce of those who did not fight in wars. Indeed Arrighi takes the definition of global governance well beyond simply material considerations when he argues that a state or constellation of states will tend to exercise a hegemonic function in so far as they lead a system of states

in a desired direction and in doing so are broadly perceived as pursuing a universal interest – an interest which nevertheless is particularly difficult to define at the level of the international or global system. He generalises as follows:

> A state may ... become world hegemonic because it can claim with credibility to be the motor force of a universal expansion of the collective power of rulers *vis à vis* subjects. Or, conversely, a state may become world hegemonic because it can claim with credibility that the expansion of its power relative to some or even all other states is in the general interest of the subjects of all states (1993: 151).

As noted a hegemonic governance and leadership claim rests not only on systems maintenance but also on the organisation of responses to rebuild international systems after they have entered into a condition of systemic chaos" – a breakdown of order and the credibility of leadership, particularly under conditions of economic crisis or war, when the demand for order tends to become more urgent and more generalised amongst rulers and subjects. Thus following the period of Dutch hegemony struggle for world supremacy emerges between Britain and France, with British power and leadership prevailing after the French Revolution and the subsequent defeat of Napoleon.

In the 19th century Britain gained relative mastery over the global balance of power initially in Europe through its links with the reactionary Holy Alliance, and later in its engagement with the more constitutional Concert of Europe, which more fully reflected the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie and the role of global finance and later as a century unfolded the emergence of mass politics and greater demands for democracy and greater inclusion in the framing of principles and beneficiaries of governance. This indicates that the basis and frameworks of global governance are transformed over time, in this case in the direction of not only reinforcing and extending merchant capitalism but also fundamentally, in the emerging industrial capitalism of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

This reframing of world order under British leadership reflected what Arrighi called the consolidation of "an entirely new instrument of world government, based upon the principle that there was no authority operating above the interstate system, with the higher authority of the world market". It was akin to "a new metaphysical entity with supernatural powers greater than any pope or emperor's in the medieval system" (1993:172). At its helm was the British Empire that rested on the subordination of India and other peripheral and subordinated peoples.

Karl Polanyi has some interesting observations on the nature and quality of the 19th century mechanisms of global governance associated with the two international formations noted above, and the transformations they embodied. Thus in the Holy Alliance:

> The kings and aristocracies of Europe formed an international of kinship; and the Roman Church provided them with a voluntary civil service ranging from the highest to the lowest rung of the social ladder in Southern and Central Europe. The hierarchies of blood and grace were fused into an instrument of locally effective rule, which needed only to be supplemented by force to ensure continental peace.

By contrast the Concert of Europe:

> Lacked the feudal as well as the clerical tentacles... A loose federation not comparable in coherence to Metternich' s masterpiece ... And yet what the Holy Alliance, with its complete unity of thought and purpose, could achieve in Europe only with the help of frequent armed interventions was here accomplished on a world scale by the shadowy entity called the Concert of Europe with the help of a very much less frequent and oppressive use of force.

He adds:

> For an explanation of this amazing feat, we must seek for some undisclosed powerful social instrumentality at work in the new setting, which could play the role of dynasties and episcopacies under the old and make the peace interest effective. This anonymous factor was *haute finance*…   [It] functioned as the main link between the political and economic organisation of the world in this period... A permanent agency of the most elastic kind... Independent of single governments, even of the most powerful, it was in touch with all, independent of the central banks, even of the Bank of England, it was closely connected with them... Yet the secret of the successful maintenance of general peace lay undoubtedly in the position, organisation, and techniques of international finance (Polanyi 1957: 9-10).

This somewhat more constitutional order meant that global governance was more inclusive of now wider ruling formations, although it still rested upon very unequal class and highly subordinated and racialized foundations. For example the British colonies, and in particular the Indian subcontinent, were subordinated to the needs of the imperial centre, with some of England's best brains – including Lord Keynes – administering the subcontinent from the India Office in London.

Kees Van der Pijl (1998) hypothesises that the extension of the imperialism of the English-speaking peoples and the formation of colonial dominions, as well as the spread of liberal ideas to the post-revolutionary United States served to constitute the emergence of a "the Lockeian heartland" which formed the centre of gravity in the emerging liberal international economic order.

Indeed after the Glorious Revolution in England of 1688, when the monarchy became a constitutional monarchy t subordinated to large holders of private property, we see the emergence of what today we might understand to be civil society, foreshadowing its extension internationally under the aegis of British and later American hegemony.[3] After the Glorious Revolution the proto-liberal state shaped the governing institutions to permit the owners of large property to flourish in autonomy from the state and therefore to be given freedom to accumulate both at home and abroad – a pattern that was transmitted via

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[3] John Locke developed many of his key ideas that were reflected in his *Two Treatises on Government* (1689) partly as a result of his experience in the American colonies, for example that civil society was created for the protection of private property by which he meant "life, liberty and estate" in a political system governed by the rule of law.

immigration to new areas of settlement, not only in North America but also South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, forming in effect a transnational political and civil society with shared perspectives and outlook. This forged a centrepiece of an international order that would, in effect, ultimately secure the sovereignty of civil society (and thereby the dominance of capitalist private property) in the forging of global governance.

The social and political formation of this transnational society was not simply the product of formal governing institutions but also involved informal, private networks that subscribe to Lockeian principles, such as those formed by some of the products of key Oxford colleges, notably All Souls, Balliol and New College and by extension educational institutions overseas such as the University of Toronto and Upper Canada College in Canada. Van der Pijl argues that parts of this transnational elite formation were interwoven with the extensive networks of Freemasons, an organisation that transcended jurisdictional boundaries such that by 1872 there were some 4 million Freemasons in the British Empire, as opposed to approximately 500,000 trade unionists and 400,000 members of the Cooperative Movement (1998: 102). Freemasonry – which van der Pijl likens to an "imaginary transnational community" – championed the separation of church and state and religious tolerance, transcending Protestantism and the counter-reformation, promoting cosmopolitanism, citizen rights and the "Rights of Man". These transnational forces operated informally (and in the case of the Masons in secrecy) and therefore it is very difficult to prove the nature and scope of their influence – but one would hypothesise that they effectively forged a form of prototypical international political party committed to Lockeian forms of civilisation, imperialism and governance, resting upon a liberal, strong but "limited" state allowing for the primacy of private forces in economic and social life.

Van der Pijl also suggests that Freemasonry in the British Empire performed the function of collective organic intellectuals "mediating the extremes and socialising technical discoveries, and finding compromises between and ways out of extreme solutions" so that the "British way of life" could continue and be extended as a "civilising force" (1998: 109) What was *included* in this nexus of government therefore were members of the so-called civilised (white) ruling classes and governing élites but also low-level officials, accountants, members of the police and other professions and members of the white working classes and settler agrarian communities. They served as a political and social force that dovetailed with an international civil service to underpin the everyday principles of liberal/imperial governance in the colonies. Excluded from this set of governance principles and practices were the subordinated classes and those peoples and nations subjected to the racialized hierarchy of the British Empire and other new areas of colonial settlement – for example slavery in the United States. As John Stuart Mill pointed out in his *Essay on Liberty* (1859) liberalism was not for barbarians, the uneducated and the "uncivilised". Liberalism was a defence of individualism against the overweening power of authority and government as well as against the "tyranny of the majority."

It would be remiss for us to forget, nevertheless, that the 19th century represented the general flourishing of global governance as we would understand it today, in particular in the technical-managerial sense, concerned with the regulation and extension of the world

market, the development standards and communications and other elements of the infrastructure that could expand industrial capitalism, as well as attempts to contain interstate conflicts seen as endangering world order. Craig Murphy's *International Organisation and Industrial Change: Global Governance* since 1850 (1994) provides a detailed account of this process, Indeed more than 30 international organisations were founded between 1864 and 1914, that were principally concerned with industrial change, creating international markers and standards in industrial goods, linking communications and transportation infrastructures, pioneering intellectual property, and "reducing legal and economic barriers to trade" (1994:2). These 19th century international organisations were also concerned with managing potential social conflicts, "strengthening states and the state system", and the "strengthening of society" – for example in the fields of human rights, relief and welfare, health, education and research as well as conflict resolution (ibid).

Murphy notes that there have been three generations of such world organisations, with each generation (that prior to 1914, the interwar period and the post-1945 period) – originating in periods of crisis or war and each was articulated with the making of successive world orders (1994: 46-81). Oddly enough, the ruling classes of Great Britain played very much a secondary role in the 19th century processes, preferring to let others take the lead provided that the organisations and their purposes were consistent with British interests. By the turn-of-the-century the liberal pattern was set: "international agreements designed to secure a more cosmopolitan civil society extended the market in which private firms could operate" (Murphy 1994: 127). This liberalism broke down with the resurgence of national monopoly capitalism and sphere of influence imperialism in the crisis of the 1930s – until the US created a new international order in the capitalist/postcolonial world after 1945.

One element that is noteworthy about the post-1945 world order was its *exclusion* of Nazism and fascism as legitimate participants in the frameworks and institutions of multilateralism and global governance. Whether that exclusion will persist and be applied to formally liberal democratic societies that have taken the authoritarian fascist route in the early 21st century, remains a moot question for the future of global governance.

In sum, many the forms of global governance today came into being during the long 19th century (1815-1914). Its essentially liberal and imperial forms of global governance helped produce the "100 years peace" amongst the great powers, although the system broke down in the inter-imperial rivalries of World War I. This breakdown resulted in abolition of many world organisations despite attempts resurrect a liberal order after 1918 with the League of Nations, partly because of the unwillingness of the United States to take a significant lead, and as high finance was severely weakened following the 1929 Wall Street Crash, and as sphere-of-influence imperialism and national capitalism came to the fore. New, powerful forces were driving "history in the gear of social change" (Polanyi 1944:237-249). According to Polanyi, Fascism "responded to the needs of an objective situation and was not the result of fortuitous causes":

> [Fascism] … offered an escape from an institutional deadlock which was
> essentially alike in a large number of countries… The fascist solution of the

> *impasse* reached by liberal capitalism can be described as a reform of market economy achieved at the price of the extirpation of all democratic institutions, both in the industrial and in the political realm (1944: 237).

This gearing and acceleration of history produced an increasingly unstable, conflict and crisis ridden international (dis) order, and a new and violent situation of "systemic chaos". Capitalism was now juxtaposed to Soviet communism, whilst fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism sought global domination in an effort to create a racialized world order. The product of these developments was the most lethal war in history, with the Axis powers denied by the unprecedented cooperation and alliance between the liberal capitalism of the United States, the forces of the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

Global Governance Today and Tomorrow: Defining the Problem as a Means to Proposing a Solution

As noted, a new system of global governance emerged after 1945 under American hegemony in the West, and Soviet domination in the former East Bloc and much of the communist world. Representation and therefore inclusion and exclusion were largely defined by and reflected in the Cold War settlement, and, to a lesser extent, the partial decolonisation of much of the former imperial regions (e.g. reflected in subsequent efforts to create a non-aligned form of multilateralism reflected in the Group of 77).

In this sense, the post-war world brought efforts to institutionalise new and relatively more inclusive frameworks of global governance – involving the inclusion of organized labour in the core of the US-based alliance systems and to a lesser extent the leaderships in the post-colonial nations, in a new world order under the domination of the superpowers. In the capitalist world, at least in North America and Western Europe, it was increasingly accepted that the Great Depression had been triggered by an over reliance on market mechanisms in governing the world political economy. For capitalism to survive after 1945 required that a historic compromise be made, involving not only capital but also inclusion of labour and some elements of the left, in governing practices.

However, the 1970s brought deep economic crisis to the capitalist world that provoked not only a weakening of the left but also the growing influence of conservative and liberal forces and policymakers who sought a return to market solutions to address and to govern economic and social problems. Subsequently social democratic and even some socialist political forces in the OECD began to repudiate the post war historical compromise of post-war reconstruction and with it, its solidaristic, relatively planned Keynesian political economy. This neoliberal political perspective that emerged increasingly excluded organized labour from its corporatist (and implicitly global) governing practices. Access of workers was hereby denied!

In sum, when growth slowed significantly during the 1970s, the postwar historic compromise was abandoned as political leaders once again gravitated to the right and towards solving economic problems through freeing the market. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 the world entered into a new phase of globalised neoliberal

capitalism with some of its characteristics similar to those of the 1920s – enormous and growing inequality and social polarization. However the present situation is quite new as it involves threats to humankind associated with climate change, the depletion of nature and challenges to the integrity of the biosphere, in a world punctuated by deepening and frequent economic and social crises that tend to hit the poorest the hardest.

Simultaneously, since 1945 there is also been enormous proliferation in the number of international organisations – both public and private – and a general mushrooming of processes of multilateralism and global governance. Whether these changes have significantly or adequately addressed some of the fundamental and inherently new problems facing humankind is quite another question.

In this context and in my humble opinion, one key question about the nature and future of global governance is whether it can continue with "business as usual" under conditions of not simply economic but a wider organic crisis, involving threats to the health of people and the planet. If prevailing principles and practices of global governance exclude serious consideration of key questions facing humankind and with it, the concerns of the majority of social and political forces affected by such changes, then what are the consequences of their continuation and what alternatives and forms of praxis actually exist or might emerge? Presumably this question is central to the agenda of this conference, and I will leave this as one of the issues to be addressed.

Let me however conclude by simply addressing in very outline terms one of the issues that must be central to the agenda of global governance in the 21st century.

Since 1945 there is been a so-called 'great acceleration' in production and consumption, resulting in unprecedented levels of affluence. This life-world rests upon an increasingly globalised, interlinked and energy-intensive pattern of worldwide development in ways that are now threatening the life systems of the planet. Since 1945 the human population has more than doubled to around 7.6 billion and by some estimates the global economy has increased at least 10-fold. However the question now is whether this pattern of development continues to be sustainable. Given the interrelatedness of the environmental, economic and social problems associated with capitalist development today, however, any attempt to treat them as separate in defining the problematic and agendas of global governance is unlikely to succeed.

Indeed a key question for global governance is how its key problems are defined, prioritised and treated, taking into account the historically unequal ways in which prevailing patterns of development have emerged as noted earlier in this paper. These should not be swept under the carpet. For example, it is a moot point whether this new era associated with fundamental changes in the planetary and atmospheric systems can be simply defined as the Anthropocene (terminology that may suggest that all members of humankind bear equal responsibility for these changes). Indeed many of the environmental changes are the cumulative product of industrial processes, which for much of the 20th century associated with both capitalist and communist development. However, and increasingly since the collapse of the Soviet Union they are now more

fundamentally linked to the extension of neoliberal capitalism on a world scale – in that sense Jason Moore's term "the Capitalocene" seems more appropriate today. Moore (2015) notes that capitalism is not just an economic system but also a "way of organising nature". I would add that this system is based on the commodification of social relations and the instrumental appropriation and exploitation of nature either as a commodity or as a sink for waste or other "externalities" of the capitalist market system.

In other words global governance has to address the question whether capitalism is the problem or the solution to the ecological question, a question that is simultaneously social, economic, political and ethical. It is unlikely whether current leadership in global governance – dominated as it is by the interests of capital and the G7 – will even consider this question in a serious way. Nevertheless there is growing contestation over this question, a new kind of impasse with both degenerative/ reactionary as well as progressive solutions beginning to gain traction politically. Centrist, cross-class parties associated with adhesion to the prevailing patterns of global governance, with its primarily capitalist solutions, particularly in the G7 nations, have been losing secular political appeal over the past 30 years, a process that appears to have accelerated since the 2007/8 global financial meltdown originating, once again, on Wall Street.

Many of the key questions which are now raised politically by such issues are linked to political struggles over growing corporate domination and private control over world agriculture, food production and distribution, and with it the proliferation of waste, pollution and the spoliation of the oceans and not least, growing corporate ownership and influence over life sciences, medicine, and pharmaceutical industries and how this configures the health and life chances of people and the condition of the planet. In this context, however, it would be a huge political mistake to underestimate the (uneven) institutionalization and political resilience of disciplinary neoliberalism, partly as a result of new constitutionalism, and its capacities to cope with, co-opt or marginalise resistance – particularly since in many respects it represents a strategy of governing through crises.

Therefore what remains an open question is which political forces will organize to significantly challenge "business as usual" particularly given the weakening of traditional left wing parties and trade unions over the last 30 years. This question involves how the middle classes will orient themselves politically to address questions of governance, exclusion and inclusion. Nonetheless in many parts of the global South new movements and progressive imaginaries are emerging in new forms of collective action – involving both indigenous peoples, workers movements, environmental organisations and many members of the public, to address both ecological social and economic considerations in a new politics, which includes the demand for "the right to have rights", namely the rights of access and inclusion. Added to the ranks of these movements are increasing numbers of scientists who are identifying with and joining political activists in new types of insurgent democratic movements:

> Given that scientists are capable of taking a very long-term view, it is not
> surprising that they tend to see the political status quo as reflecting an ostrich

mentality; political leaders and state managers are seen as enslaved by short term or immediate interests and beholden to corporate capital, employing various forms of political expediency, coercion and repression to sustain the prevailing order... This shift in the position of many scientists may be an important signal of the movement of at least some of the 'global' middle classes which may be crucial for new political thinking and outcomes (Gill 2015: 190).

So as we consider future possibilities there is much to be pessimistic about, given the apparent rise of more authoritarian forms of neoliberalism – as well as what appears to be ongoing states of emergency and the securitisation of politics and political order – and a more coercive stance on the part of significant political interests towards world order questions. Nevertheless there are also grounds for cautious optimism since there is clearly a growing constituency throughout the world that is contesting corporate domination and the lack of sustainability and credibility in the current portfolio of policies, and its associated patterns of global governance that systematically exclude from consideration questions which are central to the well-being and livelihood of a majority of people and to the condition and survival of the planet.

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